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ABSTRACT 
A priming paradigm was employed to examine the veridicality of an independent affective and 
cognitive processing system (Zajonc 1980). This assertion was tested by comparing participants 
physiological reactions to neutral and affective priming stimuli. Cardiovascular reactivity was 
recorded while participants (N=36) watched a computer monitor that presented stimuli of brief 
duration of exposure (suboptimal). At suboptimal exposures, only affective primes produced 
significant shifts in the participants physiological activity. One interpretation of these results is 
that participants' manifested an affective reaction to emotional primes without the benefit of 
conscious recognition (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980). The results are interpreted in light of 
neurological (Le Doux 1986) and behavioral evidence (Roediger 1990) to suggest support of 
interdependence of affect and cognition. This study showed that a physiological-affective 
priming paradigm has utility for examining the interdependence of affect and cognition. 
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Chapter One 
Repeated presentation of suboptimal stimuli and subsequent affective responses 
The affective priming hypothesis, asserts that affective reactions can be elicited with 
minimal stimulus input and "virtually" no cognitive processing (Zajonc 1980). This hypothesis 
challenges the notion that cognitive and affective processes are neurologically interdependent (Le 
Doux 1992a). This thesis describes research that examines the legitimacy of a claim of 
independent cognitive and affective processing. It also shows how various stimuli can elicit 
physiological reactions that may or may not be interpreted as support for independent cognitive 
and affective processing system. 
To set the stage for the present study the following three avenues of investigation are 
reviewed, 1) the mere exposure effect (Zajonc 1968), 2) the non-conscious affective priming 
effect (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc; Zajonc 1984; Zajonc 1980), and 3) physiological measures 
(Tranel & Damasio 1988; Zajonc 1968). 
Mere Exposure Effect 
. With the publication ofZajonc's (1968) paper" the attitudinal effects of mere exposure" 
the mere exposure effect became a topic of conversation in mainstream psychology. Zajonc 
defined the exposure effect as the observation that " mere repeated exposure of the individual to 
a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude toward it. By 'mere 
exposure, is meant a condition which just makes the given stimulus accessible to the individual's 
perception" (p.l ). Thus, Zajonc suggested that simple unreinforced repeated exposures lead to 
liking for a stimulus. In a series of subsequent experiments, Zajonc then went on to demonstrate 
the power of the mere exposure effect for affective experiences. 
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In Zajonc's (1968) first experiment, participants were exposed to series of nonsense 
words at frequencies ranging from 0 to 25. They then rated each stimulus word for "goodness" 
of"meaning" (i.e. the extent to which the word connotes "good" vs."bad" affect) on a seven-
point scale. Zajonc found a positive relationship between number of exposures and the average 
goodness rating for a word. He then replicated this experiment using a similar procedure but 
different stimuli: Chinese ideographs were substituted for the nonsense words used in 
Experiment 1. The results of Experiment 2 were consistent with the findings of Zaj one's first 
study; again, rated goodness of meaning was positively related to frequency of exposure. 
Zajonc's (1968) third experiment investigated the extent to which typical exposure effects 
could be obtained with socially relevant stimuli. In this experiment, subjects were shown a series 
of faces (photographs of students taken from a college year book) at different exposure 
frequencies, after which they were asked to make liking ratings of each stimulus person on a 
seven point scale. A significant, positive relationship between frequency of exposure (25 
presentations was the maximum number of presentations in this study) and mean liking rating of 
the stimuli was found. 
Stimuli presentation for the above experiments occurred at optimal levels of exposure, 
meaning the participants could clearly see the stimulus and therefore were aware of it. However, 
a related phenomenon, the affective priming effect, has consistently been found even when the 
participant has claimed that he or she was unaware that a stimulus had been presented. Stimuli in 
these experiments are presented at suboptimal levels of exposure. That is, the stimulus is either 
presented at a level so degraded that the participant cannot recognize the stimulus or, 
alternatively, presented so fast that he or she cannot see the stimulus. Manipulating the image, 
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size and focus of a stimulus constitutes suboptimal presentation of a stimulus in a degraded state 
(Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980). The standard duration for suboptimal presentation of a stimulus 
is anywhere from four to five milliseconds (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980). 
Nonconscious Affective Priming 
Change in preferences for stimuli as result of repeated suboptimal exposures to those 
stimuli is known as the nonconscious affective primacy effect. 
One example of the nonconscious affective primacy effect is found in research performed 
by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). In this experiment, similar to the mere exposure 
experiments (1968), stimuli were presented repeatedly. However, instead of presenting the 
stimuli at optimal levels of exposure, stimuli were presented at varying levels of degradation by 
manipulation of the images' size and focus. The clear finding was a direct increase in 
participants' preference for an object after repeated exposures to that object. Interestingly, the 
effect was also obtained even when the exposures were so degraded that the person was not aware 
that anything at all had been presented. They were unable to describe why they did or did not like 
the stimuli they were previously exposed to. That familiarity does not appear to be involved in 
these effects is shown by the fact that liking scores depended almost entirely on the person's 
objective experiences with the object rather than on their perceptions of familiarity with the object 
(Moreland & Zajonc 1977; Matlin 1971). It is also of some interest that Bomstein (1987) 
reported stronger exposure effects with suboptimal presentations than with optimal presentations. 
The clearest instance of non-conscious affective priming is found in experiments in which 
stimuli presentation occurs with short duration. In this type of experiment (Zajonc 1980), a 
photograph of a smiling face is presented at very short intervals, say 4 milliseconds, just before 
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another neutral and unrelated stimulus (a Chinese ideograph) is shown for 1 second. Results 
consistently show that participants' stated preference for the neutral stimulus is influenced by 
whether or not that stimulus is preceded by a smile or an angry expression. It is important to 
note that this same procedure involving the optimal presentation of the same affective prime 
produces no result (Kitayama 1991 ; Niedenthal1990). 
One way of interpreting these results is to allow for the possibility that total affective 
discriminations can be made virtually without awareness, whereas cognitive discriminations 
require greater access to stimulus information (Kunst- Wilson & Zajonc 1980; Murphy 1990; 
Zajonc 1980). Indeed, the affective primacy hypothesis (and its assumption of independent 
affective and cognitive processing) hinges on the conjecture that the simple affective qualities of 
stimuli, such as good versus bad or positive versus negative, can be processed more readily than 
their non-affective attributes. 
Physiological Evidence 
Physiological evidence is often provided (Murphy 1990; Zajonc 1980) as converging 
support for the assumption that cognitive and affective processing systems are independent. 
Zajonc (1968), for example tested the hypothesis that repeated presentation of a word would lead 
to a decrease in galvanic skin response (GSR) fluctuations that result from stimulus exposures. 
Fifteen nonsense words were presented at optimal levels of exposure with a frequency between 
one to twenty five times. Zajonc found a negative relationship between exposure frequency and 
mean GSR change in response to the final stimulus presentation, suggesting that repeated 
unreinforced exposure to a word result in a decreased autonomic arousal following later stimulus 
presentations. 
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Supplementary research is provided by Tranel and Damasio (1988). In a study of four 
patients with face agnosia, Tranel and Damasio focused on the use of GSR and self-report 
measures in response to familiar and unfamiliar faces. Results showed a strong dissociation 
between the indices. Participants generated more frequent and significantly larger amplitude 
skin conduction responses to familiar faces than to unfamiliar ones but were unable to give 
discriminatory verbal ratings to familiar faces versus unfamiliar faces. In other words, skin 
conductance revealed that face agnostic patients responded to familiar faces although according 
to their self-reports they did not appear to perceive them. In a subsequent study Tranel, 
Damasio, and Damasio (1995) tested whether nine patients with ventromedial frontal damage 
could discriminate familiar faces (family) they had exposure to prior to brain damage from 
familiar faces (psychologists) they had exposure to following the damage. Patients were also 
asked to rate each face for familiarity. Participants with bilateral frontal damage recognized the 
identity of familiar faces, yet failed to generate discriminatory skin conductance to those same 
familiar faces. The findings showed electro-dermal activity to facial stimuli that patients could 
not recognize and for which a sense of familiarity was non-existent. 
Zajonc and colleagues (Kunst- Wilson & Zajonc 1980; Murphy 1990; Zajonc 1980,1984) 
have suggested that physiological responses comparable to those found in the above studies can 
be equated with emotion. This assumption, that physiological responses are synonymous with 
affect, will be explored later in this paper. 
In sum, collectively, mere exposure, affective priming, and physiological evidence are 
cited (Kitayama 1991 ; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980; Murphy 1990; Niedenthal1990; Zajonc 
1980; Zola-Morgan, Sqiure, Avarez-Royo, & Clower 1991) as support for separate cognitive and 
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affective processing systems. However this evidence alone is insufficient to convince all 
theorists that an independent cognitive-affective processing system exists. 
The Independent Affective-Cognitive Processing Debate 
For theorists advocating a non-conscious process of emotion, emotion is often separated 
from cognition. Zajonc (1984) argued that affective influences should resist attribution 
interventions because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the 
cognitive system responsible for inferences. He suggested that early affective processes are 
automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-order interventions. As a result, preliminary 
affective responses are not represented as conscious feelings but are diffuse and can "spill over" 
from one stimulus to another. In contrast non-conscious cognition is always context specific and 
must be about something. 
Theorists such as, Ledoux (1989, 1986), and Shwarz and Clore (1987) who argue that 
non-conscious states of emotion are really subjective states of awareness oppose the idea of a 
separate affective system. In other words emotions are conscious states. In their 
feelings-as-information model Schwarz and Clore (1987) declare that judgments are based on 
perceptible feeling. Feelings are the central component of emotion and feelings are by definition, 
conscious. Like Schwarz and Clore, Ledoux (1986, 1989) asserts that non-conscious emotions 
do not exist. However, Ledoux does indicate that conscious emotional states are products of 
unconscious processes. He further suggests that processes that are themselves not permeable to 
consciousness are responsible for separating the substances of consciousness. Given the 
controversy surrounding the nature of non-conscious affect it is apparent that the question of 
non-conscious affect is as yet unresolved. 
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Overview of Present Study 
The present thesis describes an experiment that further explores the question of non-
conscious affect. The major objective of this experiment is to determine if awareness of our 
mental or implicit representation is necessary to produce physiological responses and recognition 
of those expressions. By including a physiological measure for detection of non-conscious 
affect, it was possible to circumvent the traditional method of asking for stimulus preference 
(Zajonc 1980) and instead assess directly implicit responses to stimuli. Additionally, the present 
study addresses whether facial affect type may produce differing levels of physiological arousal. 
Exploring this was made feasible through the use of physiological measures, in this instance, 
hemodynamic activity assessed by impedance cardiography (Sherwood, Allen, Fahrenberg, 
Kelsey, Lovallo, & Van Doomen 1990). 
Another objective was to determine if repeated suboptimal presentation of facial 
. 
expressions of emotion would result in increasing the threshold for detection of that emotion. In 
addition, it is quite possible that some facial expressions (e.g. anger)will result in greater 
physiological arousal than other facial expressions (e.g. disgust). Use of repeated presentation 
and impedance cardiography would help facilitate detection of participant's differential response 
to facial expressions. 
In sum, the study examined the following predictions: (1) IfZajonc's (1984) affective 
priming hypothesis has merit then there will be a dissociation between physiological and 
conscious reports. Subjects exposed to the sub-optimal presentation of emotional stimuli will be 
unable to consciously report those stimuli. However, they will generate more frequent and 
significantly changed heart rate responses to facial expressions of emotion, than too neutral facial 
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expressions. (2) Some emotions will be easier to label than others. Happiness and anger for 
example, will be easier to label than disgust (Prkachin & Prkachin 1994). (3) Some emotions will 
be easily confounded. In particular, it is predicted that fear is likely to be mistaken for surprise 
and disgust for anger (Prkachin in preparation). (4) Finally, some emotions will be easier to 
detect than others at sub-optimal levels of exposure. Happy expressions, for instance, may have 
a higher probability ofbeing detected (Ladavas, Umilta, Ricci-Bitti 1980) at sub-optimal 
exposures than any other emotion. However, detectability does not necessarily translate into 
greater physiological response. What expression will result in the greatest physiological 
response is also a question of this research, although no explicit predictions can be made from 
the available literature. 
Participants 
CHAPTER TWO 
Method 
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Thirty-six introductory psychology students (18 men and 18 women) participated in the 
following experiment for supplementary course credit. Participants were equally distributed 
across three between group conditions (12 participants per condition). The between group 
variable was the affective priming conditions of anger, disgust and happiness. A within group 
condition included exposure to optimal and suboptimal primes. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Using conductance electrodes and a BoMed Cardiodynamic Data Processing System the 
impedance ECG derived signals of heart rate, were saved to disk for later analysis of heart rate 
variability. Electrode placement was preceded with the washing of upper and lower thoracic 
regions with isopropyl rubbing alcohol. Redeux, a form of saline paste was then applied to 
facilitate conduction. Neck electrodes were attached frrst, with one half of a dual electrode 
attached at the intersection at the base of the neck and the other half of the electrode attached 
directly above. This procedure was repeated for the other side of the neck. A similar procedure 
followed for attachment of lower thoracic electrodes. Electrodes were attached bilaterally to 
either side of the thorax with the upper half of a dual electrode attached parallel to the xiphoid 
process and the other half attached just below. 
For assessment purposes, participants completed a modified version of Lindsay & 
Johnson's (1989) source monitoring test (described more completely in procedure section) and 
Izard's (1972) Differential Emotion Scale (DES). The source-monitoring test assesses 
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participants' ability to accurately memorize the representation of an event (see Appendix A). The 
DES, consists of a series of affect words (e.g., elated, tense) presented along with a four point 
Iikert scale, which participants used to self rate the emotions they were experiencing following 
stimulus presentation. At the end of each DES, a question was included asking participants to 
recall the stimuli they were exposed to in the preceding phase (see Appendix B). 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair approximately 50 em away from a 1 color 
TRL computer monitor. Mel 2 computer programming language and a 133 MHz Pentium 
processor facilitated presentation of stimulus photographs. Photographs advanced automatically 
according to preprogrammed modules designed with Mel 2 software. In total, participants 
viewed ninety presentations depicting facial expressions chosen from Ekman and Friesen's 
(1976) Pictures of Facial Affect. Photographs included one male and one female face expressing 
the emotions, sadness, happiness, anger, surprise, disgust, fear and the expressionless face of 
neutral. The expressions happiness, disgust and anger were selected as affective primes during 
one of two suboptimal phases. By "suboptimal" I mean that the stimuli were presented for an 
abbreviated time thus preventing their complete processing. The expression 'neutral' functioned 
as a control stimulus during one of two suboptimal phases. Stimulus faces were 175 X 225 
pixels X 75 resolution. 
In phase one, participants viewed one face (either male or female) and 4 of 7 possible 
expressions at optimal level (10,000 milliseconds for each face). By "optimal" I mean that the 
stimuli were presented for a sufficient duration to be processed fully. They viewed each of these 
expressions 5 times for a total of 20 presentations. In phase two, a "suboptimal" eondition, they 
viewed the same person as in phase 1 depicting one expression, not seen in phase 1, 25 times at 5 
r------------------------ ---------
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milliseconds per face. In phase three, another suboptimal condition, participants viewed the 
same face as in phase 1 and 2, and one expression not seen in phases 1 and 2 the same number of 
times and duration as in phase 2. In the fourth and final phase, an "optimal" condition, 
participants viewed the same face and expressions as in previous phases plus the additional 
expression of fear, which functioned as a foil. Each of the expressions was viewed three times 
for a total of 21 presentations. Expressions were presented for 14,000 milliseconds each, 
allowing participants time to provide verbal answers for the source monitoring test. See Figure 1 
where each of the phases is presented graphically. The expressions are presented in cartoon 
form. 
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Sadness Anger Surprise Disgust 
xs 
Phase 1 10,000 ms 10,000 ms 10,000 ms 10,000 ms I Total ~~imal~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ time=200,000ms 
Exposure 
Phase 2 
Sub-optimall--~~~--.-~~~~.1...--~~~-.-~~----1 
Exposure 
Phase 3 
Sub-optimal J--~~~--.-~~~~......__~~~--r~~-----1 
Exposure 
Phase 4 
~ptimal 
Exposure 
Figure 1 
Stimulus presentation for phases 1-4 
Happiness 
Sms 
Neutral 
Sms 
Fear=foil 
X25 
Total 
time=125ms 
X25 
Total 
time=125ms 
14000ms Total 
time=294, OOOms 
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Procedure 
Informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experimental session. 
Following agreement to participate, the impedance electrodes were attached. Participants were 
then instructed to rest quietly for an acclimatization period of 5 minutes. 
The experiment consisted of four phases, an explicit exposure phase, a neutral phase, an 
implicit exposure phase and a final test phase. These ran consecutively and participants 
performed the same task in each. Participants were not told the distinctions between the four 
phases. A five-minute rest period was included between phases one, two and three. Following 
the completion of each phase, participants completed the DES. During the (ourth and fmal phase 
participants answered the modified version of Lindsay & Johnson' s (1989) source monitoring 
test. 
Following completion of informed consent, participants were told that their task was to 
observe 20 photos of facial expressions. Participants were advised that each facial expression 
would be in view for a full 1 0 seconds and that they should look at it for the whole period as they 
would be queried at the end of the task regarding the expressions they had seen. A fixation point 
was projected for 2000 ms at the center of the screen, immediately prior to each of the facial 
expressions. Participants were exposed to a random order of facial expressions. In total, 
participants viewed four of seven possible facial expressions at optimal exposure. 
For phases two and three, counterbalancing was performed by randomly assigning 
participants to either a target priming condition in which participants were exposed 'to an 
emotional facial expression (affective stimuli) or a neutral priming condition in which they were 
exposed to a neutral expression (neutral stimuli). For brevity, explanation of phases two and 
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three assumes exposure too neutral stimuli first followed by target (see figure 2), but the reader 
should keep in mind that these phases were counterbalanced across participants. 
The stimulus for the second phase of the experiment consisted of a neutral facial 
expression. Neutral expressions are included as a control measure. These expressions were not 
observed in phase one. Neutral expressions were presented to participants repeatedly and at sub-
optimal levels of exposure. Each neutral expression was presented for 5 milliseconds, followed 
immediately by the blank backward mask. Stimuli were presented to the left visual field as 
research ( Borod 1992; Davidson 1992; Gardner, Brownell, Wapner & Michelow 1983) indicates 
that the right hemisphere is dominant with respect to processing of emotional responses. To 
ensure that participants attended to the screen during sub-optimal exposure, a fixation point was 
projected for 1000 ms at the center of the screen immediately prior to target presentation. 
Participants viewed in total 25 presentations. 
Stimuli for the third phase of the experiment were the target facial expressions of 
emotion. Target facial expressions, were not observed by participants in phase 1. For example 
participants exposed to the facial expressions of sadness, surprise, happiness, and disgust in 
phase 1 viewed the anger expressions in phase 3. Target expressions were presented to 
participants repeatedly and at sub-optimal exposures. Each target expression was presented for 5 
ms, followed immediately by the backward mask. As in the second phase, the stimuli were 
presented to the left visual field to maximize potential physiological reaction. To ensure that 
participants attended to the screen during sub-optimal exposure a fixation point was projected 
for 1000 ms at the center of the screen immediately prior to the target presentation. PartiCipants 
viewed in total 25 presentations. 
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In phase 4, participants were exposed to both the optimal (phase 1) expressions and the 
sub-optimal (phase 2 and 3) facial expressions but they were all presented at optimal fourteen-
second duration. Following presentation of each face participants were asked to identify 
expression type. All participants were informed that each facial expression would be in view for 
a full fourteen seconds and that they should look at it for the whole period, then make their 
response, even if they recognized the expression before the period was concluded. A record was 
kept of each participant's ability to identify the individual expressions of emotion. Participants 
were also asked to the source of each expression (e.g. where and if they had previously seen the 
expression) and to indicate how confident they were (on a scale of0-100) that they had seen the 
expression where they said they had seen it. See Figures 1 & 2 for further clarification of 
procedure. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Results 
The analyses of the results of this experiment are limited to the exploration of the 
responses to the suboptimal stimuli. Investigation of the responses to the optimal stimuli is 
unnecessary to address the hypotheses raised in the introduction. Differences in physiological 
responses to optimal presentation of comparable stimuli have been explored by others (Bomstein 
1987; Cabeza, Burton, & Kelly 1997; Schweinberger, Pfuetze, & Sommer 1995) and are not 
relevant to issues addressed in this report. 
In order to determine whether participants were affected physiologically during the 
different stimulus conditions, it was necessary to select an index that would logically reflect 
physiological perturbations produced by stimuli. It is well known that heart-rate decelerates 
during exposure to stimuli that evoke attention (Schwartz 1971). Ordinarily such responses can 
be evaluated by comparing heart rate levels before and after exposure to a given stimulus, and 
heart rate change (deceleration) is taken as an indication of the "registration" of the stimulus. 
Heart rate change is usually measured over an epoch of several seconds. In the present case, 
stimuli were exceptionally brief and operated in rapid succession. Moreover, it was not possible 
to link stimulus presentation to the heart-rate time series in order to determine precisely when 
heart rate changes occurred. It was reasoned, however, that if the briefly presented stimuli were 
being "registered" at the physiological level, then it would be expected that the participants 
would show a series of decelerations and recoveries of heart rate over the phase of the 
experiment. If stimuli were not being registered, or not to the same extent, then such a series of 
decelerations and recoveries would not occur. Consequently, it would be possible to detect the 
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registration of stimuli at the physiological level by measuring the variability of the heart rate 
during the relevant phases of the experiment. See Figure 3 for an example of heart rate 
variability. Given the duration of photo stimuli presentation (5ms) we were unable to assess 
visceral activity for independent stimuli. Standard deviations were therefore extracted from 
across the spectrum of participants' heart rate response for all physiological data sets. 
In preliminary analyses heart rate variability was examined across gender and 
counterbalance order. No differences were found for gender and counterbalance conditions. 
Subsequent analyses therefore ignored subject gender and counterbalancing as a factor. 
A 3 X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed comparing physiological response 
across affective priming conditions (neutral vs target) and the between subject exposure 
conditions (anger vs disgust vs happy). The results (see Figure 4 & 5) revealed a significant 
main effect for affective priming conditions, F (1, 33) = 18.61, p = .000. A paired t-test revealed 
that when participants were exposed to target affective primes their heart rate variability was 
significantly higher than when exposed to neutral target primes. The mean heart rate variability 
for target primes was 1.68 heart rate SD units, in contrast with a mean of .34 for neutral primes, 
t(35) = 4.36, p = .000. The between group difference in the preceding analysis was 
nonsignificant. Participants' differential physiological response to target and neutral primes 
provides tentative support for the notion that feature detection may be occurring without 
conscious recognition. Explicit support for this assumption is possible by examining the 
relationship between the affective priming conditions and the free recall of those conditions, 
which was the purpose of the following analysis. 
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A 3 X 2 ANOVA was performed comparing participant free recall of affective primes 
(neutral and target) across between subject exposure conditions (happy vs. anger vs. disgust). 
The results revealed a significant affective prime X group interaction, F (2, 33) = 20.92, p = .000. 
Although no participant exposed to the suboptimal neutral condition reported being aware of the 
primes, differential reports of awareness occurred depending on the target prime, participants 
were exposed to, as evident in Figure 6. In order to treat the data as conservatively as possible, a 
Scheffe pairwise comparison was selected for post hoc analysis. The Scheffe pairwise 
comparison revealed that happy faces were consciously recollected significantly more than that 
of either angry or disgusted faces. The mean recall for happy faces following suboptimal 
presentation was 83%. In contrast the mean recall for anger and disgust faces were 17% and 
.00% respectively. No group differences were found for recall of neutral expressions. As for the 
affective prime condition only happy facial stimuli (M=. 83) were recalled significantly more 
than that of neutral facial stimuli (M = .00), t (11) = 7.42, p = 000. The same pattern emerged for 
participants given the source-monitoring test. There was an affective prime X emotion 
interaction F (2, 33) = 16.41, p = .000 with only participants exposed to happy ~xpressions 
meeting the threshold of accurate designation t (11) = 4.91 , p=OOO. In short, participants exposed 
to suboptimal exposures had some sense of conscious recollection but only for happy facial 
photo stimuli. 
Given participants' capacity for recalling happy face stimuli, a 2 X 2 ANOVA was 
performed comparing physiological response across affective priming conditions (neutral vs. 
target) and the between-subject exposure conditions of anger and disgust. This was done in order 
to determine whether the results of the initial analyses might have been affected primarily by the 
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processing of happy facial expressions. The results revealed a significant main effect for 
affective priming conditions, F (1 , 22) = 15.90, p = .001. A paired t-test revealed that when 
participants were exposed to target affective primes, their physiological response was 
significantly higher than when exposed to neutral target primes. The mean physiological 
response for target primes was 1.60 heart rate in beats per minute, in contrast with a mean of .1 0 
for neutral primes, t (23) = 3.96, p = .001 (see Figures 7 & 8). Results for recall of neutral and 
target primes (anger vs. disgust) replicated those reported previously for free recall. Moreover, 
even though participants were informed of the presence of the degraded primes, they 
nevertheless still maintained that they were not aware of them. 
Finally, there were no significant differences in the participants' report of affective 
mental states corresponding with anger and happiness, as measured on Izard's (1972) DES. 
However, a trend was seen in the data, which supports the notion that observing other 
individuals' emotional expressions could influence a person's own mood. Although the trend 
was slightly higher for happy than for a neutral stimulus, this was not the case for anger or 
disgust as compared to the neutral stimulus. The opposite pattern of results emerged when the 
affective state of irritation was examined as reported with exposure to anger. Participants 
exposed to happy expressions reported irritation and anger substantially less than participants 
exposed to anger and disgust expressions. For the pattern of results see Table 1. It important to 
note that the affective state disgust was not adequately represented on the DES scale. Therefore, 
the emotion disgust was excluded from analysis and hence is not included in Table 1 as a factor 
for participants' change in emotional response. 
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Figure 3 
A Stimuli being "registered' physiologically 
A Stimuli not being registered physiologically 
Differential physiological registration of stimuli. 
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Suboptimal 
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Figure 4 
Physiological r~sponses across the target and neutral conditions among the three groups. 
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Anger, Disgust, and Happy Facial Stimuli Neutral Facial Stimuli 
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Figure 5 
Main effect for within subject condition of neutral (neutral expression) vs. target (anger, disgust, 
and happy). 
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Figure 6 
Interaction for free recall of affective primes (neutral and target) across the three between subject 
conditions. 
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Anger Disgust 
Between Subject Condition 
Physiological responses across the within subject conditions (target and neutral) by group. 
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Anger and Disgust Facial Stimuli Neutral Facial Stimuli 
(5 ms repeated presentations) (5 ms repeated presentations) 
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Figure 8 
Main effect for within subject condition of neutral (neutral expression) vs. target (anger and 
disgust) 
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Table 1 
Mean change in participants' probability of reporting affective states (DES). 
Group 
Anger 
Disgust 
Happiness 
Exposure 
conditions 
Neutral 
Anger 
Neutral 
Disgust 
Neutral 
Happy 
Reported affect 
Happiness Anger 
8% 8% 
8% 10% 
13% 8% 
13% 9% 
11% 5% 
14% 3% 
Note. Affective states of anger, irritation, and mad were collapsed to form the single emotional 
state of anger. 
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CHAPTER4 
Discussion 
To summarize our experiment, suboptimal affective target primes (in the form of the facial 
expressions of anger; happiness; disgust) presented for 5 ms to the right hemisphere, generated 
significant shifts in participants' physiological responses compared to neutral expressions 
presented for the same duration and at the same location. In addition, participants exposed to 
anger and disgust facial expressions failed to designate and report those expressions on subsequent 
source monitoring and free recall test measures. In contrast, participants exposed to happy 
expressions accurately designated and reported the expression on subsequent source monitoring 
and free recall tests. Finally, there were no significant differences in the participants' reports of 
affective mental states during any phase ofthe study, as measured on Izard' s (1972) DES. A trend 
was seen in the data, which supports the notion that observing other individuals' emotional 
expressions could influence a person' s own mood. Irritation was often reported with exposure to 
an anger expression and less often to happy faces. 
The salient finding in this investigation, was that exposure to affective primes elicited more 
variability in physiological responses than exposure to neutral stimuli. Those responses occurred 
largely without participant awareness that an emotional expression had been presented (with the 
exception of happiness). The most parsimonious explanation for the results is provided by the 
affective priming hypothesis (Zajonc 1980). 
The affective priming hypothesis asserts that positive and negative affective reactions can 
be evoked with minimal stimulus input and "virtually" no cognitive processing. In short, cognition · 
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and affect are independent processes that perform discrete operations on the same stimulus 
information. 
The findings are consistent with independent cognition and affect model if we can accept 
the validity of the following assertions: 1) visceral responses are equated with affective states and 
only affective states, 2) neurological architecture supports an independent cognition and affect 
paradigm, and 3) behavioral research supports an independent cognition and affect model. The 
remainder of this paper will explore evidence both consistent and inconsistent with cognitive-
affective independence. 
Visceral Response and Affective States 
The relationship between visceral response and affective state is difficult to explain without 
reference to the context in which it occurs. As this relationship is strongly associated 
with neuroanatomy, the majority of the debate regarding this assertion will be addressed 
concurrently with neuroanatomical evidence. Any remaining questions about this relationship will 
be discussed in the conclusion. 
Neuroanatomical Evidence 
Support for the assumption that cognitive and affective processes are independent (Zajonc 
1980, 1984) is found in the form of recent neuroanatornical discoveries. For example, separation 
of affective processes on the one hand and recognition and categorization of faces on the other is 
suggested in cases of prosopagnosia (PA). Many prosopagnosics are completely incapable of 
making even the most basic categorizations of faces, such as race, age, and gender, (Pallis 1955), 
although they retain their ability to make appropriate affective responses to distinct facial 
expressions (Ellis 1986). In fact, P A patients who suffer bilateral cerebral lesions are characterized 
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by their inability to recognize the faces ofthe persons with whom they are familiar. Interestingly, 
several studies have demonstrated that PA patients display elevated skin conductance (GSR) when 
presented with faces of persons they had previously known but could not recognize (Bauer 1984; 
Tranel & Damasio 1985). Some theorists (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980) suggest that, as with the 
mere exposure phenomenon (Zajonc 1968), prosopagnosics manifest a positive reaction to 
familiarity without the benefit of conscious recollection. These theorists therefore equate the 
physiological skin conductance response with affect. 
Interpretation of the P A results is provided by Bauer ( 1984) who has proposed a model 
involving at least two anatomically and functionally distinct pathways. He has concluded that the 
prosopagnosics' bilateral lesions selectively impair the ventral visuolimbic pathway (implicated in 
object recognition) while sparing the dorsal visuolimbic connections. These spared visuolimbic 
connections allow for a preliminary or pre-attentive analysis of the emotional significance of the 
visual stimulus. In other words, prosopagnosics seem to retain their preferences while losing their 
ability to discriminate (Zajonc 1980). 
For additional support, researchers (Kitayama 1991; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980; Murphy 
1990; Niedenthal 1990) advocating the separation of affective and cognitive processes often cite 
research performed by Zola-Morgan, Squire, Alvarez-Royo, and Clower (1991). These researchers · 
conducted tests of emotional reaction and memory function on four groups of monkeys: intact 
monkeys, monkeys whose amygdala had been removed, monkeys whose hippocampus had been 
removed (LeDeoux, 1987), and monkeys whose amygdala and hippocampus had been removed. 
Monkeys with amygadalectomies performed well on memory tasks but lost their emotional reactions 
to emotion-inducing stimuli. In contrast, damage to the hippocampal formation resulted in memory 
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deficits while leaving the emotional processes intact. Monkeys with lesions in both the hippocampus 
and the amygdala lost both their emotional reactivity and their ability to retain newly learned 
discriminations. 
There is a final line of converging neuroanatomical research cited as support for affective-
cognitive independence (Zajonc, 1984, 1989). LeDoux and colleagues (Iwata, Ledoux, Meely, 
Americ, & Reis 1986; Iwata, Chida, & LeDoux 1987; LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis 1988) 
found a direct pathway between the thalamus and the amygdala that is just one synapse long. The 
direct access from the thalamus to amygdala allows the amygdala to respond faster to some stimuli 
than to other. As the hippocampus is separated from the thalamus by several synapses, according 
toLe Doux et al, the response in the amygdala can occur as much as 40 ms faster. This 
neuroanatomical architecture would apparently allow us to like an object even without knowing 
what that object is. 
I would be remiss in not pointing out that the evidence as presented is anything but 
definitive support for neurological separation of cognitive and affective states. The supposition 
that the physiological skin conductance response can be equated with an affective state is 
speculative at best. Any number of factors may influence the outcome of a physiological response. 
In the present, for instance, it is possible to equate cardiographic perturbations with affect. 
However, these responses may be as much cognitive as they are affective. Cognitive research, for 
example, has repeatedly shown that cognitive processing can occur at a nonconscious level of 
awareness (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay 1993; Loftus 1979a, 1979b, 1981; McClosky & 
Zaragoza 1985a, 1993; Roediger 1990; Tulving & Schacter 1990). Similar to procedures in this 
experiment, implicit memory (Roediger 1990), repetition priming (Tulving & Schacter 1990), and 
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misinformation effect (Loftus 1978a) procedures demonstrate that participants can perform 
cognitive tasks and not be aware on subsequent testing that they had performed that task. It is 
likely, given this cognitive research, that both the present procedure and those previously 
mentioned (e.g. skin conductance studies) rely heavily on participants' cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, it is equally likely that this processing plays a role in the subsequent physiological 
response. We might argue then for a cognitive-affective interaction in the production of 
procedurally driven physiological responses. 
Evidence for a cognitive-affective interaction is also found in the form of recent 
neuroanatomical discoveries. Research (LeDoux 1986, 1987; Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, and 
Carmichael 1992) has shown that the amygdala receives inputs from areas in the thalamus, the 
association cortex, the perirhinal cortex, and the hippocampus. Animal studies have implicated 
each of these inputs to the amygdala in different aspects of fear processing (LeDoux 1992a). 
Thalamic to amygdala projections are important in processing the emotional significance of simple 
sensory features as opposed to complex objects. The association cortex to amygdala connection is 
important for processing the emotional significance involved in the recognition of objects. The 
perirhinal cortexes to the hippocampus connections and subsequent cortex and amygdala 
projections are important in the emotional processing of complex representations, such as the 
memory for context (Kim & Fanselow 1992). See Figure 9 for amygdala projections to and from 
cortical systems. 
It is apparent that the cognitive prerequisites for fear processing can operate on several 
levels and can be minimal, extensive or both. Le Doux (1996) suggests that thalamic sensory 
processing areas are the "gateway" to the neocortex, where object representations are constructed 
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from incoming sensory signals. Furthermore, thalamic areas are a "gateway" to the amygdala, 
where emotional significance can be attached to sensory signals. Functionally then, the amygdala 
can be activated by the thalamus at about the same time the cortex can be activated by the 
thalamus. Consequently, object recognition and emotional representation can proceed in parallel. 
This neuroanatomical architecture would apparently allow us to like or fear something without 
knowing what it is. However, this means that the representations that activate the emotional 
system can be based on incomplete information rather than on clear and complete perceptions. 
This may account for a person having an emotional response without a cognitive characterization 
for that response. For example, sense or moods that can accompany a complex sensory event such 
as the change in season yet have no apparent evidential representation. In other words, one's mood 
such as sadness could be a r~sponse to a single component (leaves falling) of a complex stimulus 
event (the season), but the individual is not capable of identifying this relationship. This kind of 
architecture may be particularly useful for initiating a response to a threatening situation. Of course 
this kind of architecture may also lead to emotional errors. However, emotional responses that are 
inappropriately initiated by the thalamic sensory inputs to the amygdala can be ~odified by 
cortical inputs, which provide multiple levels of representation to activate the amygdala (Amaral et 
al1992). 
In addition, Amaral et al (1992) have noted that the amygdala projects back to neocortical 
systems (see Figure 9). Processing in the amygdala can thus influence many cognitive processes 
organized at the many cortical levels, and at subcortical levels which include the hippocampus. 
Projections to the cortex from the amygdala may serve as pathways through which emotional 
processing can influence cognitive processing (Rolls 1990). The amygdala also projects to the 
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brainstem (Takeuchi, Mclean & Hopkins 1982) and the forebrain (Price & Amaral1981). Both the 
brainstem level and the forebrain cortex play a role in cortical arousal. 
In summarizing the cognitive-affective neurological relationship, there appears to be a 
demonstrable two-way interaction between emotion and cognition (Le Doux 1989; Amaral et al 
1992). Bi-directional connections appear to exist between the neocortex and the amygdala that 
permit upstream emotion related input from the amygdala to modulate cortical activity and 
downstream cognitive input from the cortex to modulate the amygdalas' emotional information 
processing (Ledoux 1989). 
Primary 
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Figure 9 
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Amygdala projections to and from cortical systems. 
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(From Le Deux 1996) 
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Behavioral Evidence 
Behavioral research supporting affective-cognitive independence has largely been 
generated by Zajonc's (1980) affective priming procedure, a procedure in which participants by 
virtue of repeated exposures, develop affective preferences for previously novel Chinese 
ideographs. In this procedure a priming stimulus with some emotional connotation such as a 
picture of a smiling or angry face is presented briefly ( 4 milliseconds) and is then followed by a 
masking stimulus. The masking stimulus displaces the prime from consciousness essentially by 
blanking it out. Shortly afterward, a target stimulus (a Chinese ideograph) is presented for several 
seconds (optimal exposure) and is consciously perceived. Later when given a forced choice 
recognition test, participants are unable to distinquish the priming stimulus from a new stimulus 
they had never seen. Yet despite this lack of overt recognition, when asked which of the two 
ideographs they liked better, subjects consistently preferred the one primed by the happy face. 
A number of criticisms have been leveled at experiments reporting priming effects obtained 
for stimuli presented at suboptimal levels. For the most part, these critics doubt that there actually 
is a total absence of conscious detection or identification (Bolender 1986; Purcell, Stewart, & 
Stanovitch 1983). In his experiment, Zajonc (1984) used a forced choice test of awareness to 
determine whether primes remained outside participants' conscious awareness. For this test, 
participants were exposed to two faces, one the suboptimal prime (either a happy or an angry 
expression), and the alternative, a foil that has never been seen before. Participants were then 
asked which of the two faces was the prime. Typical results showed that participants were unable 
to select the prime (happy or angry) from the incorrect alternative at a level greater than chance. 
The results in the present study are inconsistent with those reported above. In the present 
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study, participants were asked to freely recall stimulus presentations. As noted, participants 
recalled the expression "happy" at a level significantly above that of chance, whereas recall for 
angry and disgust faces was not above chance. 
One possible explanation for differences in the recollection of affective primes corresponds 
with the test procedure used by Zajonc (1984) compared to the test procedure used in the present 
experiment. As indicated, Zajonc used a forced choice test of awareness. The rationale underlying 
a forced choice test is that if the subject truly cannot detect the prime, he or she should do no better 
than chance at recognizing it. However, a potential problem with the forced choice test is the 
introduction of an unnecessary artifact. Instead of having participants recollect one prime, the 
veridical prime, they are place in a position whereby they must consider a fabricated item. The 
introduction of this artifact may result in interference with the conscious recollection of the 
veridical prime. That is, participants may have some vague sense of familiarity regarding the 
prime, but that familiarity was suppressed or interfered with by the artifact. Therefore participants 
exposed to the forced choice test may have at some level been aware of the prime, however that 
awareness may have been masked. 
Indeed, this is essentially what was found in this study, using the free recall procedure. 
With a free recall procedure no additional artifact is introduced. Participants are merely asked to 
recall the expression(s) they saw previously. In this experiment, nine out of twelve participants 
recalled the expression "happy". The majority of these participants attributed the ability to recall 
the expression to some 'vague sense' ('I just sensed that the expression was happy' ) that 
accompanied the recollection. Only a few participants indicated physical features ('a flash of 
white') as the primary reason for recollection. Since the present study did not include a forced 
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choice comparison group to directly compare our methods with those of Zajonc ( 1984 ), 
veridicality of familiarity interference notion is, at this point, a question that cannot be answered. 
Since the emotional expression of happiness produces physiological changes with awareness while 
angry and disgust produce physiological changes without awareness it can be concluded that there 
is a differential effect of the emotions on awareness or the memory of what has been seen. The 
differential effect of the three emotional expressions on memory clearly suggests that the free 
recall method is more successful than the forced choice method. This finding also leads to some 
potentially interesting comparisons between the two methods that should be conducted in the 
future. 
Another explanation for differences in recall of affective priming stimuli correlates with 
duration of stimulus presentation. For the typical affective priming procedure, suboptimal stimulus 
presentation (Zajonc 1980, 1984) occurs over 4 ms durations. This falls one ms short of the 5 ms 
duration in which affective primes were presented in the present study. It is conceivable that the 
additional 1 ms in the present experiment resulted in participants meeting a level of detection 
above that of threshold. However, this does not explain their inability to recall the negative 
affective primes of angry and disgust. 
The reason for the apparently increased saliency of happy faces over those of anger and 
disgust is best explained by the following observations. It has been repeatedly observed that happy 
faces are recognized more accurately than any other facial expression (Ekman, Friesen, Ellsworth 
1982; Kirouac & Dore 1983; Ladavas, Umilta, Ricci-Bitti 1980). Several researchers have 
suggested that the origin of this happy face advantage is a result of hemispheric differences in 
recognizing facial expressions, although they tend to disagree as to the content of those differences. 
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For example, while Suberi and McKeever (1977) claimed right hemispheric dominance in 
recognizing all facial expressions, Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson (1981), suggested that the 
dominance of the two hemispheres should depend on the polarity (positive vs. negative) of the 
facial expressions. Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson maintained that whereas the positive expression 
of happiness was recognized predominantly by the left hemisphere, the negative expressions of 
anger and disgust were recognized predominantly by the right hemisphere. Furthermore, Stalans 
and Wedding (1985) obtained faster reaction times (RTs) in the right visual field with all facial 
expressions, which would support the idea of a left hemispheric advantage. Finally, Hirschman 
and Safer (1982) found no asymmetry in the recognition of facial expressions. 
In regard to the present experiment, both negative and positive affective primes were 
presented to the left visual field (right hemisphere). In the typical affective priming procedure 
stimuli are presented to the center of the visual field. One could effectively argue for a right 
hemispheric advantage in the present experiment. However, a right hemispheric advantage is 
reported to occur for negative affective primes only, primes for which participants in the present 
experiment had no conscious recollection. Thus, the obtained patterns of results in this experiment 
are opposite to those which would have been predicted assuming a right hemispheric advantage. 
Therefore it can be concluded that right hemispheric advantage is not an adequate explanation of 
the recall of the positive affective prime "happy" in the present study. 
It is interesting to note that as stimuli were presented to the right hemisphere alone, the 
present study cannot provide conclusive evidence regarding hemispheric differences in evaluation 
of emotional polarity. However, the present findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis of a right 
hemispheric preference for recognition of negative facial expressions. As indicated previously, 
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participants in this experiment were, at some level, cognizant of the positive expression of 
happiness, but were not cognizant of the negative expressions of anger and disgust. It should be 
emphasized that this latter conclusion is only tentative as the stimuli were presented at suboptimal 
levels of exposure. 
Finally, in some respects the present findings parallel those found by Murphy (1990). 
Murphy examined participants' ability to discriminate among six specific facial expressions 
(Ekman 1972) at suboptimal levels of exposure. Participants were only able to differentiate among 
emotions that differed in pleasurable polarity. Happiness could be distinguished at a better than 
chance level from the negative emotions fear, disgust, sadness and anger. No reliable differences 
were observed among the four negative emotions. 
Null Findings and Explanations 
The absence of consciously reported feelings (DES) as a result of the priming manipulation 
is a null finding. One possible explanation is that affect produced by subliminal facial primes is 
rudimentary and possibly unconscious (Zajonc 1994). Another explanation for participants' 
absence of consciously reported feeling is that pictures of emotional facial expressions were 
insufficient to trigger emotional feelings. 
The absence of differences in the physiological data for participants exposed to either 
happiness, anger, or disgust conditions is also a null finding. Accepting a null finding requires that 
the study gave a reasonable chance for the variable to be manifest. As there were only twelve 
participants per condition, this null finding may very well reflect a power deficiency. Increasing 
the number of participants might resolve this deficiency and reveal a putative difference in 
physiological responding to different emotional expressions. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study provides suggestive, but inconclusive support for an 
independent affect and cognitive model. Neurological and behavioral studies provide both 
consistent and inconsistent evidence for differential affective and cognitive systems and states. 
The debate primarily centers on whether neuroanatomical and behavioral evidence supports 
distinct and separate systems ( Zajonce 1980), or, alternatively, that cognitive and affective 
systems are interdependent (Ledoux 1992a) 
With respect to the present results, support for an independent cognitive and affective 
model is contingent on the following 1) physiological activity is a synonymous representation of 
affect and 2) affect produced by suboptimal facial primes is unconscious. Under these conditions, 
absence of consciously reported feelings emerging with an affective physiological response is 
tantamount to a disassociative relationship between cognition and affect. However, a 
physiological unconscious representation of affect necessitates that physiology can be equated with 
affect and that affect can then be equated with that unconscious representation. As discussed 
previously, this is a theoretical question with no current resolution. 
The present research raises other important theoretical questions. For instance, what are the 
implications of affective stimuli for memory? How might the present results be integrated with 
current work on indirect memory (Merikle & Reingold 1991), implicit memory (Roediger 1990), 
repetition priming (Tulving & Schacter 1990), and the misinformation effect (Loftus 1978a). The 
common feature of these extensive lines of research on memory is that subtle tests, similar to those 
in this study, reveal memories of which the participant may not be aware. If participants show a 
physiological response to a stimulus of which they may not be aware, can that response be 
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considered a more subtle indicator of memory (Merikle & Reingold 1991 ), a distinct process, 
namely affect (Zajonc 1994), or could this response reflect an interactive process between 
cognition and affect? Apparently the present research could be interpreted with any one of these 
theoretical frameworks in mind. However, it is the author' s opinion that the interactive 
interpretation is the most reasonable for the following two reasons. One, the procedure and those 
described elsewhere (Zajonc 1980, 1997) requires both cognitive and affective input for the 
acquisition of stimuli. Secondly, neuroanatomical research (Ledoux 1992) supports an interactive 
interpretation. 
It is also necessary to explore whether affective stimuli other than faces (which may have 
very unique properties), result in a different pattern of results. For example, would presenting 
photos of a snake suboptimally change physiological activity as well as conscious reports of 
feeling. 
Future research in this domain will, it is hoped, lead to a more systematic understanding of 
the dynamics of the interactions between physiology, affect and cognition. Above all, the methods 
presented here, namely, the comparisons between the effects of suboptimal primes on 
physiology and subsequent recall might stimulate future exploration of the degree to which 
cognition and affect operate interdependently to modify physiology. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOURCE MONITORING TEST 
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Memory Test 
On the page that follows, please write down the name of the facial expression (e.g what type of 
emotion is expressed) presented on the computer monitor before you and indicate (by 
checkmark) where you seen that expression in the designated columns. In addition we would 
like you to indicate (in column provided) on a scale of 0-100 ( 0 being not confident at all, 100 
being absolutely certain) how confident you are that your choice of designation was the correct 
one. You have 14 seconds to make your decisions so please work quickly as possible. 
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Name Saw Saw Saw Never Confidence 
FacialExpression Eif.r~sion Expression Expression Saw Rating 
Type urmg During During Expression 0-100 
Slow Fast Fast 
Presentation Presentation Presentation 
1 ~ 
. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
.. 
16. 
17. 
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Name Saw Saw Saw Never Confidence 
FacialExpression E~r~sion E~r~ion E~n:ssion Saw Rating 
Type unng urmg urmg Expression 0-100 
Slow Fast Fast 
Presentation Presentation Presentation 
! 1 
. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
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APPENDIXB 
DIFFERENTIAL EMOTIONAL SCALE 
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EMOTIONS SCALE 
A number of words that describe different emotions or feelings are listed on the following 
page. 
Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the emotion 
word to indicate the extent to which it describes the way you felt during the performance of the 
preceding task. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one emotion 
word, but give the answer that seems to best describe your feelings as you recall them. 
Note: Mod. = Moderately 
Consid. = Considerably 
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Phase ld: 
Not at Very 
All Slightly Mod. Consid. Strongly 
1. Attentive 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Joyful 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Surprised 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Irritated 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Guilty 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Bashful 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Afraid 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Sluggish 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Concentrating 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Enthusiastic 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Amazed 0 1 2 3 4 
13. Scornful 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Shy 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at 
all Slightly 
15. Scared 0 1 
16. Fatigued 0 1 
1 7. Delighted 0 1 
18. Startled 0 1 
19. Angry 0 1 
20. Fearful 0 1 
21 . Happy 0 1 
22. Mad 0 1 
23. . Frightened 0 1 
24. Excited 0 1 
25. Jittery 0 1 
What expression(s) did you see? 
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Mod. Consid. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Very 
Strongly 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
